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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most distinguishing trends in United States (“U.S.”) 
litigation has been the expansion of class-action securities lawsuits and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) enforcement actions 
against U.S.-listed Chinese companies who have gone public through a 
state reverse merger process in the U.S.1 Investors in the U.S. have 
risked billions of dollars on these Chinese companies, principally under 
a belief that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) protected them 
against accounting fraud and inaccurate or inflated stock prices.2  
However, once accounting scandal concerns become ostensible, stock 
prices collapse,3 and U.S. investors are financially devastated, including 
some major investors such as John Paulson and former American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG) CEO Maurice Greenberg.4 Regrettably, 
these embattled shareholders and the SEC have little to no recourse or 
enforcement capacity where gaps in SOX, state reverse merger law, and 
a lack of international reciprocity allow Chinese and other foreign 
corporations to exploit U.S. investors.5  The federal government and state 
legislatures must take drastic measures to ensure investor confidence in 
international corporations listed on U.S. exchanges, and to protect U.S. 
investors from investing in corporations mired in fraudulent activity.  
Such measures may include imposing additional requirements on reverse 
mergers involving foreign companies, so that the SEC may potentially 
freeze foreign assets, or imposing significant diplomatic pressure on 
China. 
1. Kevin M. LaCroix, Esq., Surge of Securities Litigation Against U.S.-Listed
Chinese Companies Raises Critical D&O Insurance Issues, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP (July 14, 2011) http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/surge-of-securities- 
litigation-against-us-listed-chinese-companies-raises-critical-dandampo-insurance-issues. 
2. Dena Aubin & Andrew Shalal-Esa, Where Was SEC as Trouble Festered at
Chinese Companies?, REUTERS, July 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07 
/10/us-china-accounting-enforcement-idUSTRE7692I820110710. 
3. Clare Baldwin & Dena Aubin, Audit Watchdog Chief Sees 2012 China Deal,
REUTERS, July 8, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/08/us-pcaob-doty-idUST 
RE76754Z20110708. 
4. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
5. Id.
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Appreciably, various groups, including the SEC, have taken a number 
of steps to address and confront the issue head-on.6  The SEC has issued 
an Investor Bulletin to educate U.S. investors on the perils of investing 
in foreign corporations accessing U.S. capital markets through the 
reverse merger process.7  In addition, the SEC has brought many actions 
suspending trading or revoking registration of these China-based 
corporations.8  Furthermore, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, set up under Sarbanes-Oxley to examine accounting fraud, issued 
a report examining China-based companies, reverse mergers, and potential 
audit implications.9  In that report, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board identified 159 Chinese companies that have accessed 
U.S. securities exchanges through reverse mergers, and noted the principal 
concern that U.S. firms are not conducting thorough, proper audits of 
these companies, and that Chinese accounting firms may be inaccurate 
in their assessments.10  Moreover, Moody’s credit rating agency issued a 
“Red Flags” report for these companies to focus on investors’ concerns 
with their financial reporting,11 and NASDAQ has proposed new, more 
stringent listing requirements for companies that go public through 
reverse mergers.12  These proposed requirements are currently under 
review for comment.13 
6. See Anjali C. Das, Claims Against China-Based Reverse Merger Companies:
A Tempest in a Teapot of Gunpowder or Green Tea?, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ 
EDELMAN & DICKER LLP (July 2011) http://www.wilsonelser.com/news_and_insights 
/client_alerts/649-claims_against_china-based_reverse_merger_companies. 
7. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin Reverse Mergers
(June 9, 2011). 
8. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
9. See generally Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Research Note
#2011-P1: Activity Summary of Audit Implications for Reverse Mergers Involving 
Companies from the China Region—January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2010 (Mar. 14, 
2011). 
10. Id.
11. See generally Moody’s Investors Service, Special Comment: Red Flags for
Emerging-Market Companies—A Focus on China (July 11, 2011). 
12. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change to Adopt Additional Listing Requirements for Reverse Mergers, SEC Release 
No. 24-64633, at 1–3 (June 8, 2011).  Requirements listed are as follows: (1) traded for 
at least six months in the U.S. over-the-counter market, on another national securities 
exchange or on a foreign exchange following the filing of all audited financial statements; 
(2) maintained a bid price of $4 or more per share for at least 30 of the most recent 60 
trading days; (3) in the case of a U.S. domestic issuer, the company timely filed its two 
most recent financial statements (i.e., Form 10-Q or 10-K); and (4) in the case of a 
foreign-based issuer, the company timely filed a comparable financial statement (i.e., Form 6-
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However, these superficial notices, actions, and reporting requirements 
lack the authoritative weight necessary to stem a burgeoning issue of this 
magnitude.  The SEC itself has about 350 people in its corporation 
finance division reviewing over 10,000 public companies’ financial reports, 
and has significant resource constraints that would allow it to find every 
single reverse merger accounting issue.14  And while the SEC may 
charge China-based companies with fraudulent activity and ultimately 
win,15 Chinese courts do not enforce U.S. judgments,16 and the SEC may 
not have the means to obtain the awarded assets.17  Moreover, the lack of 
an extradition treaty between the U.S. and China allows Chinese managers 
to evade criminal conviction based on accounting fraud in SOX.18  
Furthermore, China’s trade secrets laws prevent the gathering of accounting 
evidence and work papers essential to this type of litigation.19 Finally, 
because state law governs the reverse merger process to permit China-
based corporations access to U.S. exchanges, it is difficult for the federal 
government to stop Chinese companies from the outset.20 
This article seeks to provide a roadmap for the U.S. federal and state 
legislatures to come together to protect the U.S. investor from the type of 
accounting fraud and stock misinformation that was the impetus behind 
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  First, this article will discuss 
the legal backdrop and legislative policy behind U.S. laws such as SOX 
and its enforcement mechanisms, and the ability for shareholders to 
bring securities class action derivative actions for financial fraud.  This 
article will also discuss trade secrets laws, criminal extradition treaties, 
international enforcement of judgments, and elucidate the reverse merger 
K, 20-F or 40-F) that includes an interim balance sheet and an income statement presented 
“in English.”  Id. 
13. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Order Instituting Proceedings to
Determine Whether to Disapprove Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Additional Listing 
Requirements for Reverse Mergers, SEC Release No. 34-65319, at 1 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
14. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
15. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d
199 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ordering China Energy Savings Technology Inc. to pay $34 
million judgment for stock manipulation). 
16. “First, reciprocity does not in fact appear to exist.  My research has failed to
uncover a single case in which U.S. courts have enforced Chinese court judgments without 
inquiring into the underlying merits of the dispute.  Second, Chinese courts do not believe 
that reciprocity exists sufficient to support the enforcement of a U.S. court judgment.  
My research has found no cases in which a U.S. court judgment has been enforced on 
any grounds.”  See Donald C. Clarke, The Enforcement of United States Court Judgments 
in China: A Research Note, Geo. Wash. Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 236, at 
3 (May 27, 2004). 
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process in the states, particularly in Delaware.  Second, this article will 
illustrate just how these Chinese corporations exploit the current state of 
the law and diplomatic relations with the United States to unfairly 
manipulate U.S. investors.  Finally, this article will provide two 
complementary solutions to pave the way to achieving international 
commercial accountability, by a protectionist scheme involving both the 
federal government and state legislatures and by international diplomacy 
and legal pressure. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Before addressing the principal issue of China-based corporations 
entering U.S. capital markets without fear of conviction with respect to 
their fraudulent activity, the current state of relevant U.S. law and 
international relations must be fully demonstrated.  The U.S. has enacted 
laws to protect its citizens and provide a cause of action against corporate 
fraud, felt the effect of trade secrets laws as a hindrance to discovery in 
international cases, seen the benefit of criminal extradition treaties, 
appreciated the effect of non-enforcement of its judgments, and 
developed a reverse merger process in its state legislatures that is being 
exploited.  After fully illuminating the state of the law in each of these 
five areas, this article will move to the principal issue of how China-
based corporations use U.S. state law to fraudulently capitalize on 
investors, and how to effectively stymie exploitation of U.S. law and 
diplomacy by Chinese corporations. 
A.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Significantly, the impetus behind the implementation of SOX is the 
same policy reasoning behind protecting U.S. investors from China-
based accounting fraud in the U.S. today.  When President Bush signed 
into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,21 it was in the wake of across-
the-board corporate accounting fraud, reduction in shareholders’ equity 
in Enron Corporation of about 1.2 billion, and the collapse of 
WorldCom.22  This economic collapse had been preceded by financial 
reporting irregularities at a number of other public corporations including 
Oxford Health and Xerox, and investor confidence in U.S. capital markets 
 
 21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 22. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 1:1 (2010). 
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was shattered.23  In an interview with Senator Paul Sarbanes, co-author 
of SOX, Sen. Sarbanes described the inspiration behind the Act as a 
result of “problems that were broad, deep systemic and structural” in the 
marketplace and a result of “highly-regarded public companies, along 
with their auditors . . . relying upon convoluted and often fraudulent 
accounting devices to inflate earnings, hide losses, and drive up stock 
prices.”24  Widespread accounting fraud led to a destruction of investor 
confidence in publicly-traded corporations and a decline in U.S. security 
prices.  The implementation of SOX was  precisely to assure reliability 
of corporate disclosure and accounting standards that ensure economic 
buoyancy.25 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has the capacity to regulate 
accounting standards and engage in litigation to protect against fraud or 
misrepresentation on its own initiative.26  In addition, SOX establishes 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee audit 
reports of companies subject to securities laws.27  Furthermore, SOX 
establishes a number of regulatory provisions to safeguard against 
accounting fraud.28  Of critical importance is the section on corporate 
responsibility for financial reports, which requires officers to assure the 
public that their financial statements are accurate.29  Both the CEO and 
the CFO must certify in each annual and quarterly report that they have 
reviewed their financial report, that it is true to the best of their 
knowledge, and that it reflects the financial status of the company; if the 
information is incorrect or inaccurate, the officers are subject to personal 
liability.30  This monetary liability can range up to $5 million with an 
additional criminal liability of up to twenty years in prison for corporate 
directors.31  Notably, criminal liability has acted as a major deterrent for 
U.S. capital market accounting fraud and misrepresentation.32 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Interview by Nance Lucas with Paul S. Sarbanes, U.S. Senator (Jan. 1, 2004), 
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NXD/is_1_11/ai_n25101748/. 
 25. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 22. 
 26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C, § 7202 (2011). 
 27. Id. § 7211 (2011). 
 28. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 22, at § 1:10. 
 29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2010). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding 
the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
425, 439 (2009). 
 32. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
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B.  Private Litigation 
Accordingly, disclosure of financial statements and accounting 
irregularities from SOX has also led to shareholders filing private actions, 
which may result in larger judgments and settlements.33  However, 
victimized shareholders have been authorized to file suit against publicly 
held corporations on the basis of securities fraud since the implementation 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.34  The SEC promulgated a 
landmark regulation under the Act, which provides that it is unlawful for 
any person to engage in any scheme or artifice to defraud, or make any 
misrepresentation of material fact, in the connection of its purchase or 
sale of its own securities.35  Significantly, in order for shareholders to 
have a successful fraud claim under this section, the Supreme Court has 
proffered six elements that plaintiffs must prove in litigation, citing a 
number of influential cases, statutes, and treatises in the process.36  In 
cases involving publicly traded securities, a shareholder fraud action 
must include: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) a wrongful 
state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 
(4) reliance by plaintiffs on material misrepresentation; (5) economic 
loss; and (6) loss causation, or a causal connection between the material 
misrepresentation and the loss.37 
In recent years, it has become exceedingly difficult for shareholders to 
bring derivative fraud claims.38  As with any cause of action, in a 
securities fraud action under Section10(b), the plaintiffs must plead a 
claim on which relief can be granted in order to survive a FRCP 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss.39  In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),40 which established pleading 
 
 33. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 22, at § 1:19. 
 34. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2011). 
 35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 36. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (citing Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4); THOMAS 
LEE HAZEN, 4 LAW. SEC. REG. §§ 12.11[1], [3] (5th ed. 2005)). 
 37. Id. at 341–42. 
 38. See generally Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in Federal Securities Litigation, 
1620 PLI/CORP 339 (2007). 
 39. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 40. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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requirements for these actions, which notably contained a higher 
requirement for proving scienter, or a wrongful state of mind.41  Under 
the PSLRA, the plaintiffs must “state with particularity facts giving rise 
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.”42  Recently, the Supreme Court in Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. 
Tellabs, Inc. held that this “strong inference” must be at least as strong 
as an opposing inference on the pleadings.43  The plaintiffs must allege 
facts from which a reasonable person could rationally draw an inference 
of scienter.44  Accordingly, as Jonathan C. Dickey notes in the Corporate 
Law and Practice Series, “Tellabs strengthens the pleading standard set 
forth by Congress in the PSLRA, and creates a uniformly high bar for 
pleading . . . in securities fraud cases.”45  Thus, in the context of foreign 
corporate directors, shareholders must have access to detailed facts 
against a foreign corporation at the pleading stage before the discovery 
process may begin in order to withstand preliminary motions to dismiss. 
C.  U.S. Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants under SOX and the 
Securities Exchange Act 
Significantly, U.S. courts can claim a broad swath of jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants for violations of these federal laws.46  In determining 
whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction, a court must look to 
the contacts between the defendant and the litigation.47  In assessing the 
sufficiency of the contacts, a court should determine whether the 
defendant has availed himself of the privileges of American law and the 
extent to which he could reasonably anticipate being involved in 
litigation in the United States.”48  The court also must determine whether 
the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.”49 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes a nationwide 
service of process for claims under the act,50 and this entails a “nationwide 
 
 41. Marvin Lowenthal, Revitalizing Motive and Opportunity Pleading After  
Tellabs, 109 MICH. L. REV. 625, 628 (2011). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2011). 
 43. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Dickey, supra note 38, at 374. 
 46. See In re Heckmann Corp. Sec. Litig., 869 F. Supp. 2d 519, 535–36 (D. Del. 2012). 
 47. Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 48. Id. at 370 (quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 
1985)). 
 49. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2011). 
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contacts analysis” by the federal courts.51  Under a nationwide contacts 
analysis, the jurisdiction is not confined to where the federal court 
resides, but rather the whole of the U.S.52  A nationwide contacts analysis 
also passes muster under the U.S. Constitution and due process concerns 
in federal court for federal question cases.53  Accordingly, foreign corporate 
defendants satisfy the minimum contacts test under this analysis, and 
they may be brought within the purview of U.S. federal courts under 
federal law.54 
D.  Trade Secrets Laws 
For both SEC and private litigants, enforcement of trade secret 
restrictions make it difficult to obtain the financial statements and facts 
necessary to properly allege and prevail on claims under SOX or the 
Securities Exchange Act.55  National state secrets laws can have chilling 
effects on transparency for business and trade, and businesses may be 
unable to predict sanctions or criminal convictions based on their activity.56  
Accordingly, in foreign litigation, businesses may not hand over records 
in discovery if they could be subject to their own national jurisdiction’s 
state secrets laws.57  This could render Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides the ability to compel disclosure or 
discovery in federal court,58 without force or halt litigation at the pleading 
stage. 
The U.S and its administrative agencies have faced this type of hurdle 
in international litigation before.59  In an enormous tax-evasion inquiry 
by the U.S. and the IRS against UBS, a Swiss bank, the federal government 
sued for the disclosure of 52,000 account holders’ identities.60  UBS stated 
that complying with this disclosure demand would violate Swiss law, 
 
 51. Snowstorm Acquisition Corp. v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 686, 699 
(D. Del. 2010). 
 52. In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
 53. Snowstorm, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 700. 
 54. See In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 536. 
 55. See Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 56. See generally Sigrid Ursula Jernudd, China, State Secrets, and the Case of Xue 
Feng: The Implication for International Trade, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 309 (2011). 
 57. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 58. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). 
 59. See Carrick Mollenkamp, UBS Customers Shielded by Swiss Law, Bank Says, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009. 
 60. Id. 
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and also that there was no tax treaty negotiated between the two 
countries.61  While high-level government officials in that case came 
together to settle,62 Swiss courts later ruled that its financial regulator 
broke the law in ordering UBS to transmit tax data to the U.S.63  This 
promised to negatively influence future international litigation,64 and 
Swiss lawmakers later rejected disclosure to the U.S. Justice Department 
in a further criminal investigation into UBS.65  While the IRS later 
dropped the action against UBS,66 trade secrets laws, such as Swiss 
banking law, have proven troublesome to the enforcement of laws by 
U.S. administrative agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service. 
E.  Criminal Extradition Treaties 
In the event that the SEC or shareholders overcome these litigation 
hurdles and convict foreign directors for accounting fraud, the lack of a 
criminal extradition treaty may render the U.S. helpless in enforcing 
judgments against foreign directors.  Under U.S. law, when there is a 
treaty for extradition between the U.S. and a foreign government, any 
justice or judge may issue a warrant for the apprehension of a person 
charged with a crime in his or her jurisdiction.67  The judicial and 
executive branches must follow a strict three-step process in determining 
whether to sustain a criminal charge.68  However, a lack of an extradition 
treaty means a fugitive who flees the U.S. may evade capture and avoid 
criminal charges, and the U.S. must wait until the individual is arrested 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Reports Agreement with UBS in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 13, 2009, at B3. 
 63. Chris V. Nicholson, Swiss Court Says Regulator Broke the Law in UBS Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at B2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Lynnley Browning, Switzerland Rejects Deal to Share Banking Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at B3. 
 66. Laura Saunders, IRS Withdraws its UBS Tax Case, Closing a Chapter, U.S. 
Taxpayers’ Names Handed Over; More Actions to Come, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010. 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2011). 
 68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-96 (2011).  See also Anna MacCormack, The United States, 
China, and Extradition: Ready for the Next Step?, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 
449 (2009) (describing the three-step process as follows: “(1) extradition requests are 
conveyed to the State Department, which reviews the request to ensure that it includes 
sufficient evidence regarding the requested individual and alleged wrongdoing; (2) the 
request is passed to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the jurisdiction where the person 
sought is believed to be, and the Office files a complaint in federal district court; a 
judicial officer may then issue the arrest warrant for the person sought; and (3) once the 
extraditee is apprehended, the judge conducts a hearing to determine whether there is a 
valid treaty in operation, the crime is extraditable under the treaty, and probable cause 
exists to sustain the charge”). 
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in a cooperative jurisdiction.69  While there may be a case-by-case 
informal avenue to extradition, without a treaty, cooperation between 
countries is “unsystematic, improvised, and decentralized,” and there is 
no way to check whether a country is abiding by its own laws or 
international commitments.70  Consequently, with no extradition treaty, 
obtaining a final criminal conviction is extremely difficult in U.S. courts. 
With respect to SOX enforcement, the U.S. has appreciated the value 
of an extradition treaty in its recent history.71  As a result of the Enron 
debacle, three British citizens, dubbed the “NatWest Three” for their 
involvement with NatWest Bank,72 were indicted by a grand jury in the 
Southern District of Texas for wire fraud under SOX.73  Pursuant to the 
extradition treaty in 2003 between the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) and the 
U.S.,74 the three were transported to Houston, Texas to stand trial for 
their criminal activity.75  This extradition request by the U.S, and 
subsequent approval by the High Court in the U.K. in 2006,76 can serve 
as a “successful model for prosecution of white collar crime.”77  Both the 
U.K. and U.S. worked together to gather evidence and information 
concerning the fraud in question,78 and by lowering standards for 
extradition and working together with national legislation, transnational 
prosecution has been significantly improved between the two nations.79 
 
 69. MacCormack, supra note 68, at 491. 
 70. Id. at 492. 
 71. See Kate Murphy, ‘NatWest 3’ Sentenced to 37 Months Each, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-natwest.5.103 
17714.html. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Indictment, United States v. Bermingham, No. H-02-0597 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 74. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-
U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23 (2003). 
 75. NatWest ‘Fraud’ Trio Arrive in US, B.B.C. NEWS, July 13, 2006, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5175058.stm. 
 76. Alison E. Lardo, The 2003 Extradition Treaty Between the United States and 
United Kingdom: Towards a Solution to Transnational White Collar Crime Prosecution?, 20 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 867, 894 (2006). 
 77. Id. at 893. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 903. 
SCHMIDT FINAL EDIT (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2016  1:57 PM 
 
370 
F.  Enforcement of U.S. Judgments 
In the case of private litigation and some SEC enforcement, monetary 
judgments, rather than criminal convictions, will be the remedy in securities 
actions.  Consequently, whether a foreign director’s home country enforces 
U.S. judgments is a principal concern in protecting U.S. investors.  
Presently, the United States is not a party to any treaty for reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgments.80  However, while the U.S. is 
generally considered one of the most liberal and receptive nations in 
recognizing foreign judgments,81 its size, its expansive notions of 
jurisdiction, and its excessive jury verdicts are perceived as too imposing 
for foreign nations to enforce consistently.82 
Accordingly, recognition and enforcement of a U.S. monetary judgment 
is naturally determined according to the foreign country’s enforcement 
law.83  Foreign courts will typically enforce final judgments that are in 
line with public policy.84  Foreign courts, such as Greece, Japan, and 
Mexico, will often times refuse enforcement of a U.S. judgment if their 
court would not have jurisdiction under the facts.85  Other foreign courts, 
such as Korea, Spain, and Taiwan, will often times refuse enforcement 
of a U.S. judgment if there was a failure to follow special notice 
procedures.86 Further, foreign courts will, at times, view the U.S. federal 
and state system as lacking uniformity, and deny enforcement on the 
grounds “that U.S. courts will not reciprocally recognize and enforce 
foreign judgments.”  Consequently, U.S. monetary judgments are often 
not upheld in foreign jurisdictions.87 
 
 80. Mark Moedritzer, Kay C. Whittaker & Ariel Ye, Judgments ‘Made in China’ 
but Enforceable in the United States?: Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement in the 
United States of Monetary Judgments Entered in China Against U.S. Companies Doing 
Business Abroad, 44 INT’L LAW. 817, 818 (2010). 
 81. Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments and the Need 
for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 117 (2007). 
 82. See Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come?—The Need for 
a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary 
Judgments, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 79, 93–96 (1994). 
 83. Philip R. Weems, How to Enforce U.S. Money Judgments Abroad, TRIAL, 
July 1988, at 72. 
 84. Adler, supra note 82, at 95. 
 85. Weems, supra note 83, at 74. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 94 n. 86 (citing as examples: Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 
833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) (Belgian labor dispute judgment); Ackermann v. Levine, 
788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (German judgment for legal fees); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Israeli contract judgment); Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980) (Canadian guarantee contract judgment); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 
Co. of Pittsburgh v. People’s Republic of the Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (British loan judgment); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp. 
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G.  State Reverse Merger Law 
Appreciably, after the discussion infra of SEC and private litigation 
against foreign citizens and the general state of the law surrounding 
enforcement of their potential judgments, it is imperative to discuss the 
component of state law, which allows for foreign individuals and/or 
corporations to infiltrate U.S. securities exchanges in the first place.  A 
“reverse merger” is a transaction, under state law,88 where a privately 
held corporation acquires a publicly traded shell corporation.89  A shell 
corporation is one with little or no assets and liabilities and is not in 
operation.90  The shareholders of the privately held corporation then 
exchange their shares for a majority of the shell corporation, gain a 
controlling interest in voting power and shares, and take over business 
operations.91  After the transaction, the private corporation will transform 
into a publicly traded company, often with its same name, without going 
through securities exchange registration and the initial stock offering.92 
The crux of a reverse merger deal is the availability of a shell company 
already listed on a U.S. stock exchange.93  Accordingly, private corporations 
will contact “shell brokers” who acquire shell corporations in a “secrecy-
friendly state such as Delaware, Utah or Nevada,”94 and these brokers 
 
73 (D. Mass. 1987) (Belgian bankruptcy judgment); S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Westpac Banking 
Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596 (D. S.C. 1987) (Australian letter of credit judgment); Parsons v. 
Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 565 So. 2d 20 (Ala. 1990) (Israeli loan guarantee 
judgment); Pan. Processes S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990) (Brazilian 
contract judgment); Bullen v. U.K., 553 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (British 
tax evasion judgment); Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equip. Ltd., 754 P.2d 1290 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (Canadian bad check judgment); Laufer v. Westminster Brokers 
Ltd., 532 A.2d 130 (D.C. 1987) (British brokerage contract judgment); Overseas Dev. 
Bank in Liquidation v. Nothmann, 496 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (British money 
judgment); Porisini v. Petricca, 456 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1982)(British landlord-
tenant judgment); Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 436 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1981) (Italian default judgment); Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241 
(N.D. 1980) (Canadian landlord-tenant judgment); Feuchter v. Bazurto, 528 P.2d 178 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (Mexican bad check judgment)). 
 88. Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Shell Games: A Reuters Investigation, 
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-china-idUS 
TRE7702S520110801. 
 89. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. M&A West, Inc., 538 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7. 
 92. M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1047. 
 93. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 88. 
 94. Id. 
SCHMIDT FINAL EDIT (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2016  1:57 PM 
 
372 
will coordinate the transaction, prepare documentation, and act as conduits 
for negotiation.95  Because these transactions are conducted under state 
law, they often avoid oversight by federal SEC regulators and avoid 
registration.96  While the private company avoids the initial public 
offering,97 they still must comply with continuing listing requirements 
once trading begins.98 
Foreign corporations have been conducting these reverse mergers and 
accessing U.S. securities markets.99  There are a number of reasons why 
foreign private operating companies may pursue a reverse merger.  First, 
a reverse merger allows a private company cheap access to securities 
exchanges, without the expense of a public offering.100  Second, private 
companies can gain access to public investors, providing their firm with 
more forms of equity.101  Third, they engender lower legal and accounting 
fees than entering exchanges through an initial public offering.102  Openly, 
reverse mergers are a great way for smaller companies, who can’t afford 
a public offering, to access capital for their business.103  The issue lies in 
the exploitative corporations who misuse it.104 
Notably, the purpose of registration with the SEC is “to protect 
investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary 
to informed investment decisions.”105  When the express purpose of a 
reverse merger is to access capital markets “without making the extensive 
public disclosures required at the initial public offering,”106 it deprives 
U.S. investors of particularly important protections.107  It is with this in 
mind that the SEC promulgated an investor bulletin warning of investment 
in reverse merger companies in 2011.108  The SEC warned investors that 
foreign companies using reverse mergers might have questionable 
financials, operations, and management.109  The SEC further warned that 
investors should fully research these companies before making investment 
 
 95. See M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1047 (broker Medley assisted co-defendants with 
transactions). 
 96. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 88. 
 97. M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1047. 
 98. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 99. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7. 
 100. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 
(S.D. Ohio 2009). 
 101. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 88. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). 
 106. M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1053. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7. 
 109. Id. 
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decisions.110  Finally, the SEC added a consideration that foreign companies 
have been using small auditing firms without resources to meet accounting 
obligations required by the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board.111 
III.  ANALYSIS OF U.S.-LISTED, CHINA-BASED CORPORATIONS 
Predictably, the SEC only had one foreign country in mind when it 
promulgated the investor bulletin on reverse mergers: China.112  The 
principal issue that has developed is that China-based corporations are 
accessing U.S. securities and fraudulently capitalizing on U.S. investors 
and U.S. law.  As aptly stated by Republican Rep. Patrick McHenry, a 
member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
“it appears that some Chinese firms have seen a way to access the 
strongest public markets in the world, but through the weakest area of 
enforcement.”113  First, this section will offer a more detailed vision of 
the current state of affairs.  To follow is a roadmap-style analysis of the 
U.S.-listed, China-based corporation from its inception under lax state 
reverse merger laws, U.S. investor injection of equity, fraudulent activity 
resulting in stock collapses, and finally to SEC and private litigation and 
to problems faced in enforcement against the Chinese. 
A.  Current Situation and Increasing Litigation 
Approximately thirty shareholder securities class action suits were 
filed against U.S.-listed, China-based companies in the first half of 2011, 
alleging securities fraud and violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 for derivative actions and false and misleading 
financial statements.114  Lawsuits against Chinese reverse mergers amount 
to near one-fourth of the ninety-four U.S. securities fraud class action 
suits filed from January to June.115  The SEC has recently stepped into 
suspend trading in a number of reverse merger entities including:   
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Das, supra note 6. 
 113. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 90. 
 114. Das, supra note 6. 
 115. Jonathan Stempel, RPT-More U.S. Lawsuits Target Chinese Reverse Mergers, 
REUTERS, July 26, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/26/lawsuits-classaction-
study-idUSN1E76O20A20110726. 
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(1) Heli Electronics Corp.; China Changjiang Mining & New Energy 
Co.; (3) RINO International Corporation; (4) Advanced Refractive 
Technologies, Inc.; (5) HiEnergy Technologies, Inc.; and (6) Digital Youth 
Network Corp.116 The SEC cited its reasons for suspension in each case, 
principal among them were the inaccuracy and incompleteness of 
financial information, failure to make periodic listing filings, failure to 
disclose independent auditors, and resignation of auditors after reports of 
financial fraud.117  The SEC has also revoked the securities registration 
of several reverse merger China-based corporations for failure to make 
important periodic filings to U.S. investors.118  Between March and 
December 2012, thirty Chinese firms had their auditors resign and twenty 
were delisted by the SEC,119 certainly with more accounting issues on 
the horizon.  From the perspective of the SEC and agitated shareholders, 
it is becoming increasingly clear that Chinese corporations are seeking 
out and exploiting U.S. markets and investors in order to financially 
benefit at their expense. 
B.  Exploitation by Chinese Corporations 
A systematic, detailed look into recent judgments by courts in various 
jurisdictions, including those in New York, Delaware, and California, as 
well as China’s trade secrets law and policy of judgment recognition, 
serves to present the steps each China-based company takes in order to 
exploit investors and evade judicial reproach.  First, the Central District 
of California aptly illustrates a reverse merger operation and consequent 
U.S. listing by China Agritech, Inc., which resulted in a class action 
lawsuit under the Securities Exchange Act.120  Second, the Southern 
District of New York reveals the difficulty for such class actions against 
China-based corporations to even survive a motion to dismiss,121 and an 
inspection of China’s trade secrets law highlights the difficulty in 
obtaining the requisite evidence to have a well-pled complaint.  Third, 
the District of Delaware, in two separate cases, demonstrates the fraudulent 
schemes and misrepresentation emblematic of the exploitative U.S. 
listed, China-based companies.122  Fourth, the Eastern District of New 
York in Securities and Exchange Commission v. China Energy, presents 
 
 116. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Baldwin & Aubin, supra note 3. 
 120. See Dean v. China Agritech, Inc., 2011 WL 5148598 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 121. See In re China Life Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 4066919 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 122. See Vandevelde v. China Natural Gas, Inc., 2011 WL 2580676 (D. Del. 2011); 
see also In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d 519. 
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an instructive judgment against a Chinese corporation and the available 
legal remedies.123  Finally, an examination of China’s civil procedure law, 
recognition policy, and absence of a bilateral treaty with the United States 
elucidates the barriers to remedial enforcement. 
1.  The Reverse Merger Loophole 
The Chinese corporations targeted by the SEC and beleaguered 
shareholders typically access U.S. exchanges through the state reverse 
merger process.124  In the currently ongoing case in the Central District 
of California, Dean v. China Agritech, plaintiff investors brought a class 
action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act against such a 
corporation, China Agritech, a holding company based out of Beijing, 
China.125 Agritech is emblematic of the typical Chinese company entering 
U.S. securities markets under reverse merger laws. 
China Agritech is incorporated in Delaware, but manufactures and 
distributes organic compound fertilizers for agricultural uses in China.126  
Agritech became a publicly traded company through the reverse merger 
financial technique, merging with a publicly traded shell company in 
2005 and offering its stock on the NASDAQ stock exchange.127  Plaintiffs, 
five individual investors who purchased Agritech stock, alleged four 
claims of financial fraud in this case: (1) Agritech materially misstated 
its net revenue and income for the third quarter of 2009 on its SEC Form 
10-Q filing; (2) Agritech materially misstated its net revenue and income 
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 in its 2009 SEC Form 10-K filing; (3) 
Agritech’s managers and Crowe Horwath, LLP (Agritech’s independent 
auditor) concealed subsidiary and third-party supplier transactions; and 
(4) Agritech’s managers filed a registration statement in 2010 with the 
SEC in anticipation of public offering, incorporating false financial 
statements for fiscal years 2008 and 2009.128 
Agritech’s financial filings inflated 2008 and 2009 revenues by 1,444% 
and 900%, respectively,129 and a subsequent report by independent research 
group Lucas McGee Research illustrated the dearth of production by its 
 
 123. See China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d 199. 
 124. LaCroix, supra note 1. 
 125. Dean, 2011 WL 5148598 at *1. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at *2. 
 129. Id. at *3. 
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factories in China.130  The Lucas report also highlighted the substantial 
discrepancy between levels of net revenue in Agritech’s filings with the 
Chinese State Administration for Industry and Commerce and the SEC.131 
As a result of this report, Agritech’s stock declined by a significant 
percentage and plaintiffs then brought the abovementioned securities 
action.132  In bypassing “certain regulatory requirements” to access U.S. 
private equity markets,133 Agritech’s practices demonstrate how Chinese 
companies take “unfair and improper advantage of aspects of the reverse 
merger process” in order to conceal their true financial conditions and 
swindle U.S. investors.134 
The court in Dean ruled, in its preliminary judgment, that China 
Agritech’s motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted was denied.135  In discussing 
the claims under the Securities Exchange Act, the court found ample 
evidence of financial fraud using the independent Lucas McGee Research 
report on China Agritech in conjunction with its SEC filings.136  While 
defendants suggested that differences in Chinese and U.S. accounting 
principles were the source of the financial inconsistencies, the evidence 
in the Lucas report was sufficiently compelling to find fraudulent intent 
on the pleadings.137 
2.  FRCP 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim 
In assessing whether slighted investors have an actionable fraud claim 
under the Securities Exchange Act, however, a court often does not have 
access to such independent, detailed, and dispositive reports during the 
pleading stage.  Accordingly, many of the securities claims against these 
China-based companies are denied as a result of preliminary motions to 
dismiss.138  While, illustratively, the Southern District of New York 
dismissed such a securities action for failure to state an adequate claim,139 a 
meticulous look at China’s trade secrets law explains the recurrent 
absence of compelling facts needed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. 
In In re China Life Securities Litigation, plaintiff investors brought a 
class action claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
 
 130. Id. at *2. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at *1. 
 134. LaCroix, supra note 1. 
 135. Dean, 2011 WL 5148598 at *6. 
 136. See id. at *3. 
 137. See id. 
 138. LaCroix, supra note 1. 
 139. See In re China Life Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 4066919 at *7. 
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against China Life Insurance Company Limited and its officers.140  China 
Life offered its stock on the New York Stock Exchange and filed its 
financial information with the SEC in 2003.141  A year earlier, China’s 
National Audit Office (“NAO”), which is the Chinese government’s 
highest-level audit institution, began auditing the historical finances of 
China Life and found the company, prior to its restructuring as China Life, 
had committed wrongdoing and ordered negligible financial sanctions.142  
Subsequently, the SEC itself opened an investigation of accounting 
irregularities pertaining to China Life.143 
As a result of these regulatory investigations, China Life’s stock fell 
just as Bloomberg News and Xinhua Financial Network News publicized 
reports detailing substantial misappropriation of funds in billions of 
Yuan, as well as other illegal activities.144  Once the stock price fell, 
plaintiffs alleged that China Life engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation 
by not disclosing accounting irregularities found by NAO, as well as the 
SEC inquiry itself.145  Further, plaintiffs alleged that such misrepresentation 
by China Life prior to restructuring affected the current China Life 
corporation and inflated stock prices.146  The court in the Southern 
District of New York granted China Life’s motion to dismiss, because it 
found no misrepresentation of the NAO audit and no compounding 
fraudulent denials about the SEC inquiry.147  The court further suggested 
that since the SEC had not ascertained any accounting documents, the 
SEC had dropped its inquiry.148  It based its decision on the fact that the 
stock price rose after NAO disclosure, no connection between NAO 
disclosures and the new China Life, and reliance on China Life’s own 
assertion that it was unaware of any SEC inquiry.149 
The court found that no “loss causation” had occurred,150 and it dismissed 
the claim before even reaching a discussion of the higher plausibility 
standard for “scienter” established in Tellabs.151  Accordingly, In re China 
 
 140. See id. at *1. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at *2. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at *2–3. 
 146. Id. at *3. 
 147. Id. at *8. 
 148. Id. at *5. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308. 
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Life highlights the difficulty shareholders face in obtaining the information 
necessary for a well-pled derivative complaint.  As Mimi Justice, head 
of Deloitte’s forensic and dispute practice in Orange County, California, 
stated at a recent conference, “[Chinese executives] believe they should 
not have to respond if they feel any request is too intrusive and believe 
that they can tell the SEC no.”152  Such an attitude limits the effectiveness 
of any investigation into a China-based company’s knowledge and intent, 
as well as any resulting securities claim.153 
However, the attitude of Chinese executives and the ensuing scarcity 
of dispositive information can be attributed to the laws of their home 
country.  China’s State Secrets Law effectively shrouds much of the 
substantive information about Chinese state-run organizations,154 akin to 
NAO and China Life,155 as well as the private Chinese accounting and 
financial paperwork necessary for SEC and shareholder derivative 
claims.156  As a result, not only do claimants face the preliminary motions 
due to lack of evidence, but they also may be frustrated in compelling 
discovery through FRCP 37157 during the litigation process. 
China’s State Secrets Law pressures ethnic Chinese  with foreign 
citizenship and Chinese nationals into not sharing information with 
foreign businesses or governments “out of a fear of arrest.”158  Indubitably, 
the Revised form of the 1989 State Secrets Law contains a broad and 
uncertain classification of what constitutes a state secret.159  The Revised 
Law lists policy decisions, national defense and armed forces, foreign 
relations, national economic and social development, science and 
technology, and state security and criminal offenses that harm “state 
security and national interests” as categories of state secrets.160  However, it 
also provides a “catch-all provision” to extend criminal liability to “other 
secret matters” determined by the “department administering and managing 
the protection of state secrets.”161  This vague classification is coupled 
with severe criminal penalties ranging from five years in prison to the 
death penalty, with all related proceedings being held closed to the 
public.162  A particularly egregious example of the application of this 
law is in the case of Xue Feng, an American citizen who was convicted 
 
 152. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Jernudd, supra note 56, at 316–23.  
 155. In re China Life Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 4066919 at *2. 
 156. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 158. Jernudd, supra note 56, at 318–23. 
 159. Id. at 318. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 318–19. 
 162. Id. at 319–20. 
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and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment in China.163  In that case, 
Mr. Feng was convicted for conveying public oil and gas information to 
the U.S. through his business.164  In convicting Mr. Feng, not only did the 
Chinese government determine post hoc that this information was in fact a 
state secret, but it also subjected him to numerous human rights abuses, 
denied him an attorney for over a year, and prevented visitation by his 
family.165 
In view of the broad scope and alarming nature of China’s State Secrets 
Law and its enforcement,166 Chinese accounting firms and executives 
often withhold financial records in fear of violating it.167  U.S. auditing 
firms have experienced difficulty in obtaining bank accounts, balances, 
and transactions, and have even received false information directly from 
Chinese banks.168  As Alan Linning, a partner at Sidley Austin in Hong 
Kong, aptly observes, “[Chinese firms and auditors] have a real dilemma 
on their hands as to how to respond to the U.S. regulators when to do so 
might expose them to criminal sanctions in China.”169  Consequently, many 
of the U.S.-listed, China-based corporations in the U.S. may contemplate 
and execute fraudulent schemes170 knowing that, out of fear, any related 
evidence in China may be shielded from probing U.S. administrators and 
judicial officers. 
3.  Securities Class Actions 
Nevertheless, when enough evidence is ascertained, plausible facts are 
pled,171 and jurisdiction is inevitably granted over Chinese executives,172 
 
 163. Id. at 322. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 168. Das, supra note 6. 
 169. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 170. See, e.g., Dean, 2011 WL 5148598 (China Agritech misrepresented financial 
status and production levels to profit and benefit director-owned third-party suppliers); 
In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d 519 (China Water executives falsified financial 
information to profit and induced shareholders to approve merger absolving them of 
personal liability); China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d 199 (China Energy executives 
engaged in “pump and dump” scheme in which they artificially increased stock price and 
sold their shares at inflated price). 
 171. See, e.g., Dean, 2011 WL 5148598 (surviving a motion to dismiss based on 
evidence provided by an Independent Lucas McGee Research report). 
 172. See infra Part I(c). 
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the courts have captured and illuminated the elements of fraud and 
misrepresentation by U.S.-listed, China-based corporations against their 
shareholder victims.173  Recently, the District Court of Delaware, once in 
a brief preliminary memorandum order,174 and again in a more exhaustive 
opinion,175 illustrated the basic elements of fraud continually perpetrated 
by Chinese companies under the Securities Exchange Act. 
In Vandevelde v. China Natural Gas, plaintiff shareholders filed a 
securities class action against China Natural Gas, Inc., a natural gas 
pipeline provider in China that is publicly traded in the United States.176  
Plaintiffs alleged that China Natural Gas misclassified in an SEC filing, 
and then subsequently failed to disclose, a debt restructuring from long-
term to short-term liabilities.177  When China Natural Gas failed to 
disclose any financial information about the debt restructuring in a late 
press release, its stock price declined substantially, and the shareholders 
filed this class action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act.178  At the very least, Vandevelde describes the type of fraudulent 
misrepresentation by China-based corporations that is actionable under 
Section 10(b) and SEC Regulation 10(b)-5. 
In In re Heckmann Securities Litigation, plaintiff shareholders also 
brought a claim under Section 10(b) alleging fraud and material  
misrepresentation.179  However, the intricate scheme devised by China 
Water and Drinks, Inc. demonstrates just how diabolical and dangerous 
Chinese executives may be in manipulating and defrauding U.S. 
investors.180  In Heckmann, China Water set out to merge with the 
Heckmann Corporation, a company incorporated in Delaware looking to 
acquire an operating company for its shareholders.181  China Water 
manufactures and distributes bottled water products in China.182  Plaintiffs 
allege that China Water and Heckmann Corporation misrepresented 
China Water’s financial condition in its merger agreement with the SEC, 
and fraudulently coaxed shareholders into approving the merger in order 
to profit and absolve themselves of any previous liability.183 
The criminal activities of Heckmann Corporation, China Water, and 
its chief executive, Xu Hong Bing, are noteworthy, especially in light of 
 
 173. See Dean, 2011 WL 5148598; In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d 519. 
 174. See Vandevelde, 2011 WL 2580676. 
 175. See In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d 519. 
 176. Vandevelde, 2011 WL 2580676 at *1. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27. 
 180. See id. at 527–30. 
 181. Id. at 527. 
 182. Id. at 528. 
 183. Id. at 531–32. 
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the SEC’s registration statement form filed in 2008.  Heckmann 
Corporation filed a registration statement form for the proposed merger 
with China Water.184  In that form, several risk factors about China Water 
were disclosed: (1) China Water could not maintain effective controls 
over internal auditing and financial statements; (2) extensive due diligence 
by Credit Suisse could not identify all material issues with China Water; 
and (3) the acquisition of China Water could negatively affect Heckmann 
Corporation’s stock, net worth, image, and could potentially force the 
company to write-down assets.185  Regardless, Heckmann filed a joint proxy 
with the SEC recommending the China Water merger to its shareholders.186 
Five months after shareholders approved the merger, Xu resigned and 
received windfall stock gains.187  Then, the company issued its financial 
results for the first quarter and disclosed significant financial inconsistencies 
and China Water’s extreme debt and incapacity, leading to massive 
shareholder loss.188  China Water’s executives had been reporting a separate 
set of financial numbers to Chinese officials and the SEC, respectively.189  
In addition, Xu falsified his educational and employment history, his 
name, and was, in fact, a convicted felon.190  As a result, China Water’s 
misinformation campaign financially devastated Heckmann shareholders,191 
and represents the scope of fraudulent exploitation of U.S. private citizens 
achievable by Chinese corporations in U.S. equity markets. 
4.  Securities and Exchange Commission v. China Energy                   
Savings Technology, Inc. 
The U.S. government, acting through the SEC in its administrative 
capacity, has also commenced its own securities actions to stem this 
upsurge in fraudulent activity.  Principal amongst these actions is Securities 
and Exchange Commission v. China Energy, in which the SEC alleged 
that China Energy, in cooperation with other third-party actors, engaged 
in a “pump and dump” scheme of artificially inflating stock prices in 
 
 184. Id. at 528. 
 185. Id. at 528–29. 
 186. Id. at 529. 
 187. Id. at 530. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 531. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. at 530. 
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order to profit.192  While China Energy’s unlawful securities activity is 
another typical example of Chinese exploitation, the Eastern District 
Court of New York’s description and subsequent application of the SEC’s 
available court remedies is particularly instructive.193 
In the case, China Energy entered U.S. stock markets through a 
reverse merger with a Nevada shell corporation, Rim Holdings, which 
was owned by the other third-party defendants.194  China Energy’s principal 
business involved “developing, marketing, distributing and manufacturing 
energy saving products” for commercial and industrial use in China.195  
For a short period after market entry, China Energy and the other 
defendants artificially increased the price of China Energy stock through 
a series of sham transactions between them.196  As a result, China Energy’s 
stock rose from $12 to $28 per share, at which time defendants sold 
millions of shares for a windfall gain.197  Subsequently, the NASDAQ 
suspended trading in China Energy stock, China Energy announced the 
“mass resignation of its officers and directors” to the SEC, and disconnected 
all phone lines and returned all mail as undeliverable.198 
As China Energy and the third-party defendants did not respond to the 
complaint or otherwise appear before the judge, the court entered a 
default judgment for the SEC.199  Accordingly, the court could bypass 
the preliminary evidentiary issues because all allegations of liability in 
the complaint were deemed true in default.200  As a result, the SEC 
sought an order utilizing various court remedies including: (1) permanent 
injunctions; (2) disgorgement of unlawful profits; and (3) appropriate 
civil remedies under the Securities Exchange Act.201  The SEC also 
sought a preliminary injunction to freeze the assets of defendants located 
in the U.S., as alleged in the complaint.202 
First, the SEC sought to enjoin defendants from future securities 
violations and from acting as a director or officer in any capacity.203  For 
potential future securities violations, the court has broad discretion to 
 
 192. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 199–200. 
 193. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 194. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 200. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 200–01. 
 198. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *5. 
 199. See id. 
 200. Id. at *6; see Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L. U.L. Realty Corp., 973 
F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 201. See id. 
 202. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
 203. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *7. 
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award an injunction after considering four factors: “(1) the degree of 
scienter involved; (2) the isolated or recurring nature of the fraudulent 
activity; (3) the defendant’s appreciation of his wrongdoing; and (4) the 
defendant’s opportunities to commit future violations.”204  In China 
Energy’s case, the company engaged in systematic wrongdoing, failed to 
provide assurances against future violations to the SEC, and failed to 
acknowledge its wrongdoing.205  Accordingly, China Energy and the 
individual defendants were permanently restrained from securities 
violations directly or indirectly.206  For the officer and director bar, the 
court has broad discretion to award an injunction after considering six 
factors: “(1) the ‘egregiousness’ of the underlying securities law 
violation; (2) the defendant’s ‘repeat offender’ status; (3) the defendant’s 
‘role’ or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the defendant’s 
degree of scienter; (5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation; 
and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur.”207  In China Energy’s 
case, the individual defendants engaged in fraud and deceit in their 
capacity as executives and were consequently restrained from holding 
any director position for a public securities issuer.208 
Second, the SEC sought to disgorge profits in accounts controlled by 
defendants in the amount of $50,755,892.04.209  Once federal security 
law violations have been found, the court has broad discretion to order 
disgorgement of wrongful profits.210  In addition, the court has broad 
discretion to further award prejudgment interest on the amount disgorged.211  
In China Energy’s case, the court could determine only that $29,665,625.28 
located in certain specific bank accounts was a result of the illegitimate, 
criminal conduct.212  Further, the court awarded $3,652,554.34 to be 
disgorged by defendants as prejudgment interest.213 
 
 204. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Softpoint, 958 F. Supp. 846, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 
China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *7; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Major 
Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). 
 205. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *8. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995); China Energy 
Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *9. 
 208. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *9. 
 209. Id. at *10. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at *12–13. 
 212. Id. at *12. 
 213. Id. at *17. 
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Third, the SEC sought to level civil penalties against defendants for 
fraudulent actions causing millions of dollars in China Energy investor 
losses.214  Congress enacted the civil penalties as a further financial 
disincentive to engage in securities fraud, and the court has discretion to 
determine said penalties in light of the circumstances of the case.215  In 
China Energy’s case, the court assessed civil penalties totaling $1,075,000 
against various defendants.216 
Finally, the SEC moved for a preliminary injunction and temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) to freeze the assets of defendants.217  In 
support of the motion, the SEC produced evidence that conclusively 
showed funds located in accounts in the U.S. directly traceable to the 
fraudulent proceeds.218  Accordingly, the court entered the TRO against 
defendants, limiting the asset freeze to the “disposition, transfer, or 
dissipation of any proceeds from the sale of China Energy stock.”219 
Using all of the abovementioned methods, the SEC made a concerted 
effort, through traditional court remedies, to hold executives and related 
parties to China Energy’s fraudulent activity.220  Moreover, while there 
has yet to be a reported case where criminal liability has been imposed 
on Chinese executives pursuant to SOX, criminal conviction may also be 
an additional court remedy for fraudulent activity through SEC 
misrepresentation.221 However, even in the face of evidentiary findings, 
consequent court judgments, federal corporate and securities law, and 
U.S. administrative action, Chinese corporations continue to unabashedly 
exploit U.S. shareholders.222 
5.  China’s Barriers to Enforcement 
Conspicuously, U.S.-listed, China-based companies’ recklessness with 
regard to U.S. securities law can be attributed to the fact that Chinese 
courts do not enforce U.S. judgments.223  Furthermore, China and the 
U.S. are not currently parties to a bilateral criminal extradition treaty, so 
China is under no obligation to extradite a Chinese national to the U.S. 
pursuant to any U.S. criminal conviction.224  Consequently, a closer look at 
 
 214. Id. at *14. 
 215. Id. at *15. 
 216. Id. at *17. 
 217. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372. 
 221. See supra notes 21–32 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Clarke, supra note 16, at 1. 
 224. MacCormack, supra note 68, at 446. 
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Chinese civil procedure law, as well as the state of U.S.-China criminal 
cooperation, may serve to illuminate the logical impetus behind the 
continuing fraudulent activity by Chinese executives. 
Initially, U.S. judgments have virtually no force or effect in Chinese 
courts under China’s domestic law and policy.225  The Civil Procedure 
Law of the PRC of 1991, Articles 267 and 268, outline the standards and 
rules for enforcement of foreign judgments by Chinese courts.226  However, 
the law has proven quite dubious and uncertain.227  These provisions allow 
Chinese courts to review recognition of judgments on the merits and enforce 
recognition of judgments based on reciprocity.  The Law does not specify 
circumstances under which Chinese courts may refuse to enforce foreign 
judgments and provides a “catch-all” ground for non-recognition where 
enforcement would be contrary to “state sovereignty, security, and/or public 
policy.”228  Additionally, since Chinese courts rarely publish decisions, 
there is a lack of empirical evidence as to the effectiveness or interpretation 
of any of these terms,229 which leads to further prospects of non-
recognition.  Moreover, Chinese courts’ “parochial protection of Chinese 
parties,” as well as other factors, such as “the lack of judicial independence 
in China, the prevalence of local protectionism, the unimaginable social 
consequences of bankrupting state-owned enterprises, the paucity of 
necessary legal provisions curbing debtor fraud and facilitating judgment 
collection, and the lack of understanding of and conceptual conflict 
between the Chinese and U.S. legal systems,” render U.S. judgment 
enforcement in China practically nonexistent.230 
Pertinently, the enforcement of U.S. judgments in China directly 
impacts whether Chinese nationals choose to violate U.S. securities law.  
Concededly, in China Energy, the Eastern District Court of New York 
found for the SEC in its judgment requiring the defendants to disgorge 
upwards of $34,000,000 in wrongful and fraudulent profits.231  However, 
 
 225. See generally Clarke, supra note 16. 
 226. Carolyn B. Lamm, Chiara Giorgetti & Jiamie Chen, Enforcement of U.S./ 
Canadian Judgments and Arbitral Awards in China, WHITE & CASE LLP, at 4 (2010), 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay. 
cfm&ContentID=4991. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 6–7. 
 229. Id. at 5. 
 230. Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China 
from a U.S. Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 759 
(2004). 
 231. See supra notes 211–18 and accompanying text. 
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as Chinese courts typically do not enforce U.S. judgments, close to 
$30,000,000 will not be recovered by the SEC or the United States 
government.232  While $4,000,000 will be recovered pursuant to the 
preliminary motion for a TRO freezing assets located in the U.S.,233 
China Energy executives and third-party defendants may conceivably 
travel back home to China with a handsome surplus, courtesy of victimized 
U.S. investors.  For all practical purposes, then, it seems no civil remedial 
enforcement mechanism exists as a disincentive or consequence to 
fraudulent securities activity. 
Second, no potential criminal liability serves as a disincentive for 
Chinese executives contemplating exploitation of U.S. equity markets, 
due to a lack of both a bilateral extradition treaty and the prospect of 
cooperative state efforts.  Currently, no extradition treaty exists between 
the two countries primarily because of the U.S.’s insistence on China’s 
improvement in human rights, public corruption and the rule of law.234  
While China has expressed a desire to enter into a treaty with the U.S., 
until a significant Chinese social policy overhaul, the advantages of 
“regularity, clarity, and predictability” in extradition will be absent from 
the current “case-by-case approach.”235 
Encouragingly, there have been instances of cross-border cooperation 
between the U.S. and China regarding financial criminal activity.236  In a 
case involving the Bank of China, managers embezzled $485,000,000 
from the Bank of China and laundered the money into the U.S. through 
casino accounts.237  When one of the managers was convicted of 
racketeering in the U.S., he spent twelve years in jail and then was 
extradited to China for further incarceration.238  In a case involving 
Randolph Guthrie, an international DVD piracy kingpin, Guthrie was 
arrested in Shanghai pursuant to a joint U.S.-China investigation, and 
then extradited to the U.S. for sentencing.239  However, the distinguishing 
characteristic in both of these cases was how decidedly advantageous the 
outcomes were to both the U.S. and China.240  Absent a bilateral 
extradition treaty, the case-by-case approach proves to be much more 
limited for traditional criminal conduct in each country.241  Significantly, 
 
 232. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
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 234. See MacCormack, supra note 68, at 446. 
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where political, economic, religious or social matters complicate a criminal 
conviction, collaboration between the countries or state agencies may be 
even more strained.242 
Here, a criminal conviction for securities fraud by Chinese nationals in 
the U.S. not only benefits the U.S. exclusively, but it also involves 
sensitive socio-political and economic interests.  Accordingly, no instances 
of criminal extradition pursuant to federal SOX legislation seem likely 
under these circumstances.  As attorney Phillip Kim explains, “If you’re a 
CEO of a company based in China and sign a false Sarbanes-Oxley 
certification, it’s very difficult for the U.S. government or Justice 
Department to charge you with that crime, indict you and bring you to 
justice.”243  Furthermore, some Chinese executives resist answering to 
U.S. authorities at all.244  While SOX legislation applies to any company 
that sells securities in U.S. markets, whether they are based in the U.S. 
or another country, “few Chinese executives fear being led away in 
handcuffs because of the lack of an extradition treaty.”245 Accordingly, 
the SOX legislation does nothing to deter Chinese companies in the same 
way that it deters domestic accounting misconduct by criminalizing 
financial misrepresentation.246 
C.  What Needs to Change 
In view of the gross violations perpetrated by these foreign corporations, 
as well as the international and domestic impediments to judicial reproach, 
the U.S. government must realize that its legislative regulatory power is 
diminishing in the global marketplace.  Transnational corporations are now 
the major players in world trade, and foreign direct investment has been 
steadily increasing, most notably in developed countries.247  The growing 
economic interdependence of the world’s economies is demonstrated by 
the growing importance of transnational companies investments and the 
significance of private investment for developed nations,248 such as the 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
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 247. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
1995 (New York 1995), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir1995overview_en.pdf. 
 248. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
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U.S.  Moreover, these foreign companies are increasingly tempted to 
engage in foreign corruption absent any civil or criminal liability.249  In 
this increasingly volatile, global corporate environment, Congress and state 
legislatures need to address these private and public regulatory issues with 
Chinese companies, while also charting a broader path toward international 
commercial accountability. 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
To solve the immediate problem of U.S.-listed, China-based companies’ 
exploitation of U.S. investors, federal and state governments must work 
together under a two-pronged approach.  First, the U.S. government should 
engage in a proactive diplomatic policy with China to make accounting 
and other such practices more transparent, move toward a bilateral 
extradition treaty, provide political and legal pressure to relax trade secret 
laws in litigation, and promote flexibility.  Second, the U.S. should engage 
in a more protectionist domestic economic policy.  For instance, Congress 
should pass a bond requirement for foreign-based corporations entering 
U.S. securities markets and state legislatures should require a more stringent 
registration process for foreign-based reverse mergers.  The federal 
government should also seek to lower the corporate tax rate to counter 
these additional regulations and incentivize lawful foreign investment.  
As a result, this two-pronged approach may serve as a model for solving 
future foreign-based corporate accountability issues. 
A.  International Diplomacy and Pressure 
Preliminarily, the U.S. should open up diplomatic channels with China 
while also promoting a more transparent and flexible corporate foreign 
policy.  Specifically, the U.S. should look to the 2007 E.U. Directive on 
Shareholders’ Rights (“E.U. Directive”) as a guide.250  Furthermore, the 
SEC should engage with the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(“CSRC”), the SEC’s Chinese counterpart,251 to formally assess corporate 
regulations and solutions, similar to the 2008 SEC pilot mutual recognition 
program with Australia.252  Moreover, the federal government should put 
political and legal pressure on China during this type of international 
litigation as the U.S. and the IRS did during the Swiss UBS litigation 
 
 249. See Philip M. Nichols, Colloquy: Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times 
of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 272–73 (1999). 
 250. Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutory 
Regimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 826–27 (2008). 
 251. See Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2. 
 252. Hill, supra note 250, at 842–43. 
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saga.253  Finally, the U.S. should make strides toward a bilateral extradition 
treaty or increase further step-by-step cross-border cooperation for corporate 
criminal prosecutions. 
First, China’s corporate access to operation in U.S. securities markets 
must be more transparent and flexible to protect U.S. shareholders.  
Pertinently, the E.U. Directive addressed corporate scandals in a “cross-
border context” with respect to European capital markets.254  It contained 
reforms designed to strengthen shareholder rights, promote flexibility, 
and increase standards of transparency and accountability in the E.U. 
without burdening over-regulation.255  While these reforms addressed 
current shareholder obstacles between European nations, the U.S. could 
apply these transparency and flexibility principles in a similar directive 
with China. 
Second, the SEC should more effectively coordinate with the CSRC to 
address reporting regulations, conflicts of corporate laws, and promote 
cooperation between the U.S. and China.  In 2008, the SEC entered into 
a pilot mutual recognition program with Australian corporate regulator 
ASIC in order to assess each other’s regulatory system and determine 
appropriate levels of investor protection.256  The SEC should look to 
engage in a similar program with the CSRC to find solutions to root out 
corporate fraud both in the U.S. and in China. 
Third, during the inevitable securities litigation against U.S.-listed, 
China-based corporations, the U.S. should put political and legal pressure 
on China to relax the China State Secrets laws when U.S. investors are 
directly injured.  As in the Swiss tax-evasion litigation,257 U.S. government 
officials should meet with Chinese officials to settle differences and 
relax applicable trade secrets laws that prohibit the necessary discovery 
in corporate securities litigation. 
Finally, while a bilateral criminal extradition treaty with China is 
unlikely absent significant Chinese social reform,258 the U.S. must continue 
to build on the step-by-step approach for criminal extradition with China.259  
 
 253. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 254. Hill, supra note 250, at 827. 
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These instances of cooperation for financial criminal activity260 are 
encouraging and the U.S. must properly articulate to Chinese officials 
why mutual law enforcement cooperation benefits both the U.S. and China. 
B.  Protectionist Domestic Economic Policy 
Next, the U.S. should look inward and promote a more protectionist 
domestic economic policy.  This requires a concerted effort by both the 
U.S. Congress and state legislatures to combat investor exploitation by 
these U.S.-listed, China-based corporations.  On the federal level, Congress 
should pass a bond requirement for foreign-based corporations to place a 
certain amount of investment assets in the U.S.  At the state level, the 
U.S. should encourage state legislatures to require more stringent 
requirements narrowly tailored for reverse mergers by foreign-based 
corporations.  Furthermore, Congress should consider lowering corporate 
tax rates to counter these additional requirements and to encourage 
lawful foreign investment. 
First, Congress should pass a bond requirement for foreign-based 
corporations, specifically those merging or buying a subsidiary in the 
U.S. and entering U.S. securities markets, in order for the SEC and courts to 
have access to assets in the event of litigation.  As in the China Energy 
litigation, the SEC or securities plaintiffs would be able to freeze or 
attach these assets when litigation begins.  The assets would only be 
required in the U.S. for a limited time period, or until determination of 
lawful accounting practices.  Accordingly, this bond would provide some 
restitution for the SEC and aggrieved U.S. investors, and it would bypass 
many issues with regard to China’s non-enforcement of U.S. judgments. 
Second, state legislatures should enact narrowly tailored, stringent 
requirements for foreign-based reverse mergers in their respective states.  
Since the SEC and the federal government cannot root out every 
exploitative corporation,261 the states have the responsibility to take steps 
to prevent easy access to U.S. securities exchanges through state corporate 
law. 
Finally, to combat these additional regulations and disincentives, the 
U.S. Congress should consider lowering the corporate tax rates to 
incentivize foreign investment.  The U.S. corporate tax rate is one of the 
highest in the world.262  As such, lowering corporate tax rates may 
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“encourage inbound foreign direct investment.”263  Accordingly, while 
the U.S. needs to protect itself and its investors from the exploitative 
Chinese corporation through protective regulations, the U.S. still needs 
lawful foreign investment to make the economy grow in this global 
marketplace. 
C.  Conclusion 
China-based corporations have been exploiting U.S. investors through 
fraudulent, manipulative schemes, while hiding behind a veil of trade 
secrets laws, criminal impunity, and non-enforcement of judgments.  
However, the U.S. federal and state governments may, and should, take 
proactive steps to make international corporate activities more transparent 
and flexible, and consequently hold these Chinese companies accountable.  
While the increasingly global economy poses many domestic dangers, 
cooperative and coordinated action by all levels of government may 
protect U.S. investors not only from these China-based companies, but 
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